The intensity of the South African War (1899)(1900)(1901)(1902) escalated sharply during the guerrilla phase in the rural areas outside the conventional theatre of operations.
the War. The focus of the article is to explain why the reaction against Bergh and his black unit was so strong and bitter, and also disproportionally stronger than the general feeling of animosity toward the British.
Introduction
The formation of black men in armed units during the South African War (1899-1902) added an additional dangerous spin to the conflict. The actions of the black units, which often operated under the command of 'joiners', very quickly instilled fear, uncertainty and insecurity in the hearts of the local Boer community.
The task of these units was initially to spy and to remove and transport women and children to concentration camps. They also engaged small groups of Boers in the field when an opportunity presented itself. The actions of these units progressively fuelled an already escalating conflict.
1 This juxta-positioning of 'joiners' and black units in a meta-war, parallel to the main conflict, ignited intense feelings of bitterness in the Boer community. This strong feeling of animosity toward the 'joiners' was encapsulated in a poem that was sent anonymously to members of the National Scouts during the war:
Verraders! Monsters! Vloek der Aarde:
Verneerde schepesels der natuur:
Gods waken die u tot heden spaarde:
Verdelg u eens door Helsche Vuur.
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Focus of the article
The geographical context of the article is the theatre of operations of the 'joiner' Olaf Bergh, who led a unit of black scouts during the War. The outer limit of his theatre of operations was a triangle bordered by the Free State towns, Ventersburg, Winburg and Brandfort in the south. The specific focus of the investigation will be on the centre of the triangle, namely the surrounding area of the small Smaldeel siding. 3 The siding forms the pivotal point of an investigation into a case study relating to the killing of three burghers just south of Smaldeel (Theunissen). The Boers were killed on 31 March 1901 by Bergh's scouts and the reaction of the community after the killings reverberated through the district for decades after the War. 4 However, the article will also discuss similar events in other parts of the theatre of war.
The focus of the article is to conduct a case study to explain the high level of animosity that was felt after the War towards the 'joiners' who commanded these black units. However, the underpinning question investigates why the reaction was so intense in spite of the low number of Boers killed in the area as a result of the actions of these units.
A strong visual indication of the high levels of animosity is the wording on a small memorial in Theunissen's local cemetery. The memorial was erected in 1927
to commemorate the death of the three local Boers who were killed by Bergh's scouts during the War. In spite of the fact that the memorial was erected more than two decades after the War, the sharp and bitter wording is an indication that the ill feelings toward Bergh and his unit had not subsided. The underpinning hermeneutics of the wording on the memorial is explicit and uncompromising and leaves no doubts as to the intensity of the feeling.
A memorial is not a monument
In a general sense a memorial differs from a monument because the fundamental reasons why they are erected differ. Memorials are not erected to remember heroes, but primarily to honour the dead, while monuments are erected to honour heroes. Memorials have a deeper imbedded meaning and are backward looking; commemorating an incident that happened in the past. The embedded message of memorials is that it is important not to forget. 5 Monuments are forward looking to reflect the heroics of the dead into the future. The memorial (displayed above) in Theunissen was erected almost 26 years after the South African War to commemorate the death of three local Boers at the hand of Bergh's black unit. The three Boers were killed just south of the town, near the Vet River bridge close to the old pump station. The inscription on the monument contains the names of the three burghers and a reference to the incident. The reference is that the Boers were murdered (not killed) by a horde of armed barbarians under the command of a 'joiner'. The word 'murdered' on the memorial had been underlined to accentuate the atrocity and the reference to the command of a 'joiner' was indicated by an arrow. 8 The message on the memorial is uncompromising and strong and demands that the deed by the 'barbarians' should never fade from memory and that future generations should be aware of the treason committed by the 'joiners' who commanded a black unit. The imbedded meaning of the memorial is the message that it is important not to forget. 9 (Emphasis added)
The uncompromising bitterness that radiates from the memorial insists that this incident should be remembered for generations to come. The intriguing reality is that the memorial and its underlying message do not align with the reality of the War. The relatively small number of Boers who died at the hand of black units is disproportionately small compared to the total number of Boers killed in the area, and even more so to the total number of deaths on the Boer side during the War. In order to understand why, it is important to understand the phenomenon of 'handsuppers' and 'joiners' during the War. Bergh progressed from his role as intelligence officer to a more active role as commander of a black unit known by the local people as the 'Winburg kaffir commando' (sic). The unit consisted of 400 -500 armed blacks who operated in the broader Winburg district. It appears that the Bergh scouts had a roving commission.
The unit broadened its scope and helped to round up the civilian population, raided livestock, looted farm houses and clashed with Boer guerrillas. 22 The unit committed a series of atrocities against women and children in the process of rounding them up for transportation to the Winburg and Brandfort concentration camps. 23 The manner in which the removal was done created a lot of bitterness in the Boer community around Smaldeel. However, it was predominantly two incidents that elicited the strongest reaction in the district during and after the War. The community never referred to these incidents as the killing of Boers in a battle or war, but as 'an act of murder committed by barbarians under the command of joiners'. 24 The background to the incident at Smaldeel was similar to that of other In total it seems that there was evidence of 13 deaths in the district that occurred as a result of encounters with Bergh's scouts. These incidents were always referred to as acts of treason or as murder. In a number of cases extreme brutality was alleged, but often the evidence was contradictory. None of the accounts referred to the incidents as killings that took place in the heat of battle.
Placing the deaths in perspective
It transpires that the number of Boer deaths in the district that resulted directly from the actions of a black unit commanded by 'joiners' was comparatively low. Boje and Pretorius calculated that a mere 19 burghers died in the Winburg district during the three years of the War in skirmishes with black units under the command of 'joiners'. 29 In the Smaldeel area the number of burghers who died was less than ten. In contrast, Commandant Sarel Haasbroek of Winburg executed 18 black soldiers of Bergh's unit in one single incident as retribution for their earlier killing of four burghers. 30 It is therefore difficult at first glance to understand the disproportionately bitter reaction of the community to the low numbers of Boers killed.
It is important, however, to put the participation of these black units and the of the defenceless women, who had no choice but to comply. 34 There is documented evidence given under oath by women who had been molested by members of the armed black units who threatened them with death unless they gave in to their demands. 35 Mrs A Meyer wrote after the War about the actions of a black unit commanded by Olaf Bergh, detailing that women were molested by the black soldiers on the farm while the 'joiners' lurked at the periphery of the group, too embarrassed to be identified. Pretorius made the observation that the concentration camp writings display in some instances more negative reaction towards blacks than towards the British. 37 General de Wet's son, Izak, wrote in his memoirs that the 'joiners' were 'the froth, debris, vagabonds and traitors' who joined the enemy. 38 De Wet wrote that the highest form of treachery was to assist with the 'kaffirs' and 'hotnots' 39 to capture Boer women and children to put them in concentration camps. Emanoel Lee in To the Bitter End stated that the 'joiners' amongst the Afrikaners were remembered to this day with such hatred that it is almost impossible to get any information about them. 40 Perhaps the best description of the 'joiners' was contained in the one-word description of Johanna Brand in Die Kappie Kommando, who referred to the 'joiners' as 'Judas-boere'. 41 When compared to the total number of Boers killed during the War, this bitter reaction to the comparatively low number killed by black units seems disproportionate. In the Winburg district only 19 Boers were killed by black units during the War. 42 In comparison, the casualties of the War in its entirety numbered 22, 000 British soldiers and 7, 000 Boers, which makes the number of deaths at the hand of the armed black units seems almost insignificant.
In addition, the number of armed black units under the command of 'joiners'
or British officers was rather insignificant in comparison with the overall numbers of the Boers and the British forces in the field. This was especially true in the Free
State where the total number of 'joiners' and armed black soldiers was not very high.
The Orange River Volunteers (ORC) in the Free State were never able to recruit the high numbers that the National Scouts in the Transvaal were able to attract.
According to British reports the official number of ORC members was only 248 men. 43 The ORC was commanded by the former Boer general Piet de Wet at
Heilbron and the former Boer captain Fanie Vilonel at Winburg. 44 (The latter was reinforced by an additional 500 black troops. 45 )
The murders at the Vet River bridge near Smaldeel 47 The farm
Paardenvallei where the incident took place was well known to the locals and to the local 'joiners'.
Witnesses to the incident stated that the killing happened when Bergh's scouts trapped some Boers at Vredeplaats south of Smaldeel station (Theunissen). 48 The killings took place about six kilometres south of the siding near the old bridge close to the railway crossing over the Vet River.
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According to the testimony of Willem and Jeremias Cronje the bodies of the Boers who were killed were horribly mutilated. 50 Mrs A Meyer wrote after the War that the two (three?) Boers who were shot at the bridge over Vet River south of Smaldeel were mere boys. 51 She stated that their bodies were pulverized by concentrated shooting in an apparent case of overkill. According to Meyer's account Bergh proudly displayed the two Boers' blood-soaked jackets in the Winburg magistrate's office for everyone to see 52 as evidence of the sharp shooting prowess of his black unit. 53 The reaction to the killings was memorialized as described above and corresponded with the then prevailing attitude towards these killings, which was that the Boers were murdered, not killed in battle. 54 Even though the memorial was erected 26 years after the incident, it is clear that the intensity of the reaction had in no way subsided over the years.
Hatred and bitterness: 'handsuppers' and 'joiners'
In light of the accusations and counter-accusations that were made as the brutality of the War escalated, it is almost impossible to ascertain 'who did what to whom' and to assign guilt. This is even more difficult given what Boje and Pretorius refer to as the tyranny of available evidence, since the accounts contained in the archives are almost exclusively from a Boer perspective. 55 It would therefore be an act of impossibility after all these years to establish guilt based on the weight of evidence. The focus of the article is therefore not to assign guilt, but to explain why the hatred elicited by the actions of black units commanded by 'joiners' lingered in Afrikaner society for so long. The contours of bitterness eventually underpinned the formation of political parties such as the National Party, which capitalised on these incidents for decades to ignite patriotism and to boost their support. These sentiments also formed the bedrock for the success of the National Party in later years and contributed to their victory in the 1948 election. 56 The 'handsuppers' who resided in concentration camps and/or on farms were despised by the Boers, but they were tolerated to a certain extent. However, this same tolerance was not extended to the 'joiners', especially when they commanded a black unit or were part of such a unit which committed atrocities against small groups of burghers and/or women and children. (See the earlier comment by Izak de Wet, who wrote that the highest form of treachery was to assist the 'kaffirs' and 'hotnots' 57 to capture Boer women and children to put them in concentration camps.)
Olaf Bergh was assisted by a small group of local 'joiners' during the War, such as Viviers and Du Bruyn. They were outcasts in the Smaldeel (Theunissen) community for decades after the War. One of the elderly local residents, Hendrik
Gutter, recalled how his father's car broke down close to the Viviers residence almost 30 years after the War and they needed to call on him for assistance. Gutter recalls how clandestinely his father approached the Viviers residence, remarking that he hoped nobody from the town would spot them entering the homestead of a former 'joiner'. These killings must be seen in the context of the brutalizing effect of war.
British records list 235 incidents of unarmed blacks being killed by Boers in the field. 63 This sheds light on the treatment of the 'joiners' after the War and the deep contempt and resentment towards them. They were very rarely accepted as equals back into the community. There are reports of incidents where 'joiners' were attacked and in some instances they were afraid for their lives. 
Murdered and not killed
Although the impact of the black units at a military level was relatively insignificant, their impact at a psychological level was substantial. Grundlingh points out that the 'atrocities' of the black units were given as one of the six main reasons by the Boer deputation to Vereeniging for deciding to lay down their arms and negotiate for peace. It was specifically mentioned at the conference that the 'arming of the blacks who committed grievous atrocities and murders' was one of the main reasons for deciding to negotiate for peace. 66 The danger presented by the black units under the command of 'joiners' in the vacuum left by the disintegration of security and stability in the farming community was a strong deciding factor to end the War. to shoot a native and warned that the vulnerable parts of a black man are smaller than those of a white man, especially the heart, brain and vital parts. 68 In a skirmish at Gatberg near Ugie on 20 November 1901 Commandant
Bezuidenhout's small force of 53 men was repulsed by an armed black unit under command of Captain Elliot. Four Boers died and the local farmers, who buried the bodies and witnessed the skirmish from a distance, declared in written statements that they had found the actions of the black soldiers brutal. The farmers stated that the black soldiers were also armed with assegais and knobkerries. 69 They further stated that the bodies of the burghers were mutilated during and after the battle and that their bodies were cut open with assegais. One burgher's head was in pieces and his brains were spilling out. Another burgher had his lower lip and the skin of his forehead cut off. 70 After the War Bezuidenhout lodged an official complaint with the AttorneyGeneral of the Cape, not about the killing as such, but the manner in which his men were killed. 71 Bezuidenhout specifically stated that the four men were 'murdered'
and not 'killed in battle'. The small memorial that commemorated the battle and the fallen burghers in Ugie carried the following inscription on the lower section:
"Wreed vermoor deur gewapende kaffers (sic) naby Gatberg Kotie van der Westhuizen, decided to ambush the unit they were trapped and wounded. The black soldiers then tied the two wounded Boers to two horses and the unfortunate men were pulled to pieces. 74 Van den Heever also described the deaths of Boer burghers Potgieter, Botha and Van Schalkwyk near Doornberg, not as killing, but as murder. 75 The inscription on the memorial in the Theunissen cemetery referred to the three Boers as 'viciously murdered by black barbarians under the command of a white traitor.' 7677 It was the method that was used and who did the killing and the manner of killing, rather than the killings per se that was despised.
The third explanation for this intense hatred was the combination of two concepts that were both regarded as repugnant to the Boers; namely 'joiners' and armed black militia. Olaf Bergh's unit reflected these two focal points of hatred.
When Bergh's unit killed Boers in the area it invoked that hatred, because it was contrary to the Boers' belief that the black community should stay out of the war.
The fact that these units threatened the vulnerable Boer women and children further exacerbated the reaction.
Conclusion
The article aimed to contextualize and explain the disproportionate reaction to the substantial number of Boers killed by British forces versus the smaller number killed by black units, which elicited a much more intense reaction. The discussion predominantly referenced the killing of a small number of Boers by Bergh's scouts near the small Smaldeel siding. The article attempted to put the events in perspective to explain why the relatively minor incidence of Boer killings by these units elicited such bitter and adverse feelings within the larger ambit of the War.
On the face of it this reaction does not appear logical or even plausible.
However, this phenomenon cannot be fully understood by adopting a logical approach. There is a very strong emotional and subjective dimension to the response.
Applying an objective test is therefore inappropriate, because the reactions came from a very personal angle and viewpoint. It will be much more appropriate to apply a subjective test from the viewpoint of those who were closest to the events in order to get a clearer understanding.
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